GEOFFREY WHEELER

RACIAL PROBLEMS IN SOVIET MUSLIM ASIA

ITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

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1. Russian Central Asia in the 19th century. *Based on a map prepared for* History Today *by S. H. Perrin*

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INTRODUCTION

THE present brief study aims at describing the impact of the Russians and their civilization on the Muslim peoples of the eastern republics of the Soviet Union. Every effort has been made to record the facts in so far as they can be determined, without drawing either morals or comparisons. To present an objective picture is, however, no easy task. There are no impartial accounts of past and present events and affairs in Asiatic Russia during either the Tsarist or the Soviet periods, and claims and counter-claims made by supporters and opponents of the present régime are often exaggerated.

Outside the Soviet Union racial problems and the tension resulting from them have for many decades past been freely and often acrimoniously discussed wherever they arose, and the situation in some countries has been considerably eased by the grant of self-government to former colonial territories, sometimes willingly and sometimes under pressure. In the Soviet Union, which includes nearly half the total area of Asia, the authorities do not admit the existence of any racial tension or even of any racial problems. They say that this results from Article 123 of the Constitution, which stipulates that 'any kind of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of their racial or national characteristics, and similarly any encouragement of racial or national exclusiveness or of hatred or neglect are punishable by law.' But, as in other countries whose constitutions include or imply the same liberal principles, and where there is in fact no discriminatory legislation, it does not necessarily follow that people of all nationalities are treated equally or uniformly in the Soviet Union. There are indeed certain geographical and demographic factors which make this almost impossible.

The object of the present study is neither to condemn nor to condone; nor is it concerned with defending other systems against Soviet charges. There is much to be learnt from the Russian handling of various colonial problems, but it should be made clear at the outset that there are two circumstances which sharply distinguish Soviet Asia from other colonial empires. The first is that although originally inhabited by peoples racially and culturally quite distinct from the Russians, Soviet Asia is geographically contiguous to European Russia and is not separated from it by any abrupt physical or climatic barriers. Secondly, in the U.S.S.R. the Russians have always enormously outnumbered the Asians: taken together, that is, Great Russians, White Russians, and Little Russians or Ukrainians, they make up nearly eighty per cent. of the total population of the Soviet Union, and they now constitute nearly one-third of the total population of the six Muslim republics.

The plan of the study is a simple one: it begins with two historical chapters; then follow four chapters dealing with the demographic, cultural, social, and economic impacts; finally, there is a chapter on the Soviet attitude towards the non-Soviet east, and a brief concluding note. The appendixes describe the source material used and the distribution of the Muslim population.

I. THE TSARIST PERIOD

IN the middle of the thirteenth century the greater part of what used to be known as Russia-in-Europe was overrun by a coloured Asian people, the Mongols, and remained under their domination for 250 years.

The Russians were not, as is still sometimes thought, themselves of Asian origin, nor did they intermingle with their conquerors in any sense which could have justified Napoleon's saying: 'Scratch a Russian and find a Tatar'. Nevertheless, the Mongol domination is of great significance in the study of Russian handling of racial problems.

Mirski takes the view that 'in many respects, especially in the political and economic sphere', the Mongols 'were greatly superior to the Russians'. Culturally, even in the thirteenth century, the Russians were superior, but there is no doubt that they profited greatly from the *pax Mongolica* and from Mongolian government institutions. The Mongol, or as it is known in Russian history, the Tatar domination, left, indeed, an indelible mark on the political and económic development of Russia, but had no influence whatever on Russian culture. Such Mongolian words as found their way into Russian relate mostly to administration or finance. Examples of these are words like *den'gi* (money), *tamozhyna* (custom-house), *kazna* (treasury, actually of Arabic origin), and *yarlyk* (formerly a prince's charter, but now merely a 'label'). This imperviousness of Russian culture to Mongol influence was due to two causes: firstly, the cultural personality of the Russians was essentially religious and the ideals and atmosphere of the Greek Church pervaded the whole of Russian society, creating a powerful national sentiment. This resulted in an instinctive resistance to Mongol paganism. Secondly, there is the fact of the attitude of complete

toleration which the Mongols observed towards religion. The first Khans were Shamanists. Batu's son was for a short time a Christian. His brother was a Muslim. The next Khan was again a Shamanist. Uzbek, who ruled from 1314 to 1341, was a Muslim. Thenceforward Islam was established as the official religion of the Khans, but the policy of toleration continued.

Although Russian cultural life was unaffected, the Russian princes were in a state of complete submission, and their quarrels among themselves were frequently settled by the Khan, who insisted not only upon the regular payment of tribute, but also on the maintenance of peace. To this end the mandatory system of granting *yarlyks*, or permits to rule, was established and Saray, the capital, became a centre for distributing power, which naturally attracted Russian princes competing for the title of Grand Prince.

There were two prevailing attitudes towards Mongolian power: some, like the great Russian hero, Alexander Nevskiy, favoured the plan of temporizing with the Mongols in order to defend Russia against attack from the west by Swedes, Germans, and Lithuanians; others, like Daniel of Galicia and Michael of Chernigov, refused to submit. Throughout the period of domination the Mongols were the national enemy, and where a tendency to submit showed itself, it was largely opportunist and attendant on the day when the invaders could be finally expelled.

Direct contact with the Mongols was thus limited, and the so-called Oriental aspects of Muscovy which surprised Europe in the sixteenth century, such as the conception of autocracy, the seclusion of women, the long dress and beards, were of Byzantine rather than Mongol origin. Intermarriage between Russians and Mongols was rare, and occurred mostly during the subsequent colonization of Siberia, where Russian emigrants, particularly the Siberian Cossacks, did mix to some extent with Mongol elements. The infusion of Mongol blood as the result of the invasion was insignificant.

Mongol rule over Russia came to an end in 1480; but long after that date the Muscovite State was subjected to inroads from Turkic tribes, and the Volga Khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan were not finally subdued until 1552. It was shortly after this that the great eastward movement across the Urals began. It was in no sense a co-ordinated expansion but rather an irrepressible urge set off by the removal of Mongol rule and restrictions. The predatory spirit of the Cossacks, the merchant-adventurer tradition of the Novgorod traders, and the sense of mission implanted in the Russians by the feeling that they were heirs to the Byzantine imperial tradition all played their part.

Russian expansion in Asia falls into three phases, which can only be described very briefly here. The first was a movement due east from the Urals to the Pacific, which was reached at the end of the seventeenth century. In this phase only primitive tribes were encountered, and these were soon outnumbered by the Russian settlers.

The second phase was the gradual spread over what is now Kazakhstan. This was begun by Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century and continued until the middle of the nineteenth. In so far as the Russian government of Catherine II had any Central Asian policy, it was to establish some kind of frontier from which trade could be conducted with settled states, and particularly with Bukhara and Kokand, to which envoys had first been dispatched during the seventeenth century. Early contacts with the Kazakhs were marked by liberal notions as well as by the most remarkable ignorance and gullibility. The Russians assumed that the Kazakhs were ethnographically identical with the Tatars, and for a hundred and twenty years insisted on corresponding with them in the Tatar language; they built numerous mosques for the benefit of the Kazakhs, most of whom had only the vaguest conception of Islamic rites and dogmas; and they greatly exaggerated the power and reliability of the various Kazakh Khans. Great importance was attached to the 'voluntary declaration' of

allegiance to Russia made by the Lesser Horde of the Kazakhs in 1734, an importance which later appeared quite illusory, but has recently been re-emphasized by Soviet historians.

Kazakhstan, the Stepnoy Kray or Steppe Region as it was then called, did not come completely under Russian control until 1855, by which time the Russians had established themselves on what they hoped would prove their permanent southern frontier. They were soon, however, to find that the states which lay to the south were not regularly organized in the sense that profitable trade could be conducted with them, and that they afforded bases for marauding expeditions directed against Russian caravans, and a refuge from Russian punitive operations. Since the Syr Darya line was clearly impracticable as a frontier, the only alternative was to advance still farther in spite of misgivings in Petersburg.

The third phase was the advance from a line passing roughly east and west through the Aral Sea to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. It began in 1855 and ended with the Battle of Gök Tepe in 1881. The Russians now entered the so-called oasis region, where the people were far more numerous and culturally advanced than those of the Kazakh steppes. The great cities of Bukhara and Samarkand had been centres of Muslim learning since the end of the tenth century, and Muslim influence was firmly established even in the rural districts.

Thus, in their rapid spread over Asia the Russians had successively encountered the primitives of Siberia, the nomads of Kazakhstan, and the relatively sophisticated and cultured people of the oases; and all this in country territorially contiguous with their own homeland, from which it had no abrupt differences of climate or vegetation. This geographical fact was calculated to produce a relationship between conquerors and conquered, between settlers and natives, quite different from that found in overseas empires. There were other exceptional circumstances: the Russians and the peoples of Central Asia were not such strangers to

each other as, for instance, the British and the peoples of India; the 250-year domination of Russia by the Mongols and the fact that the Tatars of the Volga Region had been an integral part of Russia since the sixteenth century meant that there were never those feelings of biological or social superiority and inferiority which existed elsewhere; finally, the peoples of Central Asia never experienced the sensation of signal military defeat, for they never offered the Russians any organized military resistance.

There is a great scarcity of detailed information about the Russian administration in Central Asia up to the Revolution. What would undoubtedly be the most fruitful source, the nineteen-volume report of the Palen Senate Commission which visited Turkestan between 1909 and 1910, is not available to the West apart from a few odd volumes in the United States. The quality of such official and unofficial contemporary Russian accounts as are available is very unequal, and they have not so far been subjected to objective analysis by Western historians. Contemporary foreign accounts, such as those of Schuyler and Curzon, are good as far as they go, but must now be regarded as incomplete and out-of-date, Schuyler's, which is by far the fuller account, having been written in 1873. On the whole, both Russian and foreign contemporary accounts are critical of Russian administration, and Soviet historians, who alone have access to all the available material, have until recently been loud in their condemnation of Tsarist Russian methods as being entirely bad and unrelieved by any humanitarian consideration whatsoever. When, however, certain factors are remembered the Imperial Russian record of administration in Central Asia is by no means wholly discreditable. Only some sixty-five years elapsed between the final subjugation of the Kazakh Steppe and the Revolution. During this period Russia was involved in four major wars—with Britain in 1854, with Turkey in 1877, with Japan in 1905, and with the Central Powers in 1914. In spite of what now appear to be grave shortcomings in administration and attention to

the people's welfare, Russian rule imparted to Central Asia a degree of peace and security which had been unknown for centuries; the standard of living of the Central Asian peasantry does not, on the whole, seem to have been much lower than that of the peasantry in some parts of European Russia; and in the matter of civic freedom, the Central Asians were better off in some respects, notably in that of conscription, to which they were not subjected until 1916, and then only for service in back areas. The problem of administering a vast, sparsely populated area like Central Asia was greatly complicated by the decision to allow the states of Bukhara and Khiva, containing nearly a third of the whole population, to retain a partially independent status with their own armies and their own judicial and economic systems.

Apart from the faintly liberal gesture of preserving the nominal sovereignty of Bukhara and Khiva, the Tsarist Government do not appear to have formulated any plans for eventual self-government by the Asian 'nationalities'. Indeed, they do not seem to have recognized the existence of any distinct nationalities. This was partly because there were no distinct nationalist movements, but only vague strivings towards some kind of special cultural and judicial treatment, and partly for fear that the eventual granting of independence to the peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia would jeopardize the growing oil and cotton industries of Baku and the Fergana Valley. Another factor of great importance, to which more attention will be paid in a later chapter, was the colonization of Central Asia by the Russians. By 1914 the number of Russian and other non-Asian settlers had risen to over two million, or about a fifth of the total population of Turkestan and the Steppe Region. They regarded Central Asia as their home and as an integral part of Russia, and their continued presence there was to make the grant of real self-government to the indigenous peoples impossible, even for the idealists of the Revolution.

The widespread revolt which broke out in Central Asia

in 1916 was to prove a fortunate circumstance for the new régime. The underlying cause of the revolt was undoubtedly maladministration, of which the worst feature was the preference shown to Russian settlers over the natives in the matter of irrigation water. The decree calling up a certain number of able-bodied men for labour service merely fanned smouldering discontent into a flame.

In conditions of peace and stability in metropolitan Russia the most probable result of the revolt would have been the early application of long-overdue reforms, for which Kuropatkin, the Governor-General of Turkestan, had long been pressing. In the event, the discontent which caused the revolt and continued after its suppression resulted in the Revolution and the consequent collapse of Russian power being greeted with acclamation. The early promises of self-determination and respect for traditional beliefs and customs, coming as they did when anti-Russian feeling was at its height, undoubtedly made the Central Asians look upon Communism and the Soviet régime as welcome successors to Russian rule.

Soviet historians' treatment of the revolt has varied according to changes in policy: sometimes it has been found reactionary, sometimes progressive; sometimes it was organized by the British, Turks, and Germans, working either separately or in concert, sometimes by Bolshevik agents; sometimes it was anti-Russian in essence, sometimes only directed against the official administration; sometimes it was instigated by the Muslim clerical element, sometimes opposed by it. The most recent version is that it was on the whole progressive, but that there were elements and areas of reaction, notably in Turkmenistan as a result of Persian intrigue. Throughout, it is claimed, the Central Asians conserved the friendship for the Russian people which they had conceived since the early days of their 'incorporation' into the Russian Empire.

In attempting to assess Russia's progress in handling racial problems up to the time of the Revolution it is important to

bear certain facts in mind. In 1917 nearly half of the total area of Asia was under Russian rule; but the total population of Russia's Asian dominions amounted to little more than twenty millions, while the number of Russian settlers was over ten millions. It is difficult to describe the relationship subsisting between the Russians and their subject Asian peoples on the eve of the Revolution with any degree of precision. For the historical and geographical reasons already alluded to, this relationship was different from that found in contemporary colonial empires: the attitude of the Russians was less aloof, less consciously superior in material matters; Russian settlers, for instance, did not insist on a standard of living far higher than that of the local population. Culturally, however, the Russians considered themselves immeasurably superior to the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus, particularly in matters of religion. They feared Islam as a sinister and secret force, and the fact that it seemed to elude their control engendered a distrust of the subject races which coloured the whole system of administration. They did little or nothing to increase literacy, which in Central Asia stood at about three per cent. in 1917, and in consequence clerical and official posts were mostly held by Russians. There were no national military formations which would have brought the people into close contact with Russian officers, and the number of Russian civil or military officers who had any knowledge of local languages seems to have been very small.

II. THE REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR

EVEN before 1917 Lenin and the other architects of the Revolution had violently denounced Tsarist imperialism and the Tsarist treatment of subject peoples. The outbreak of the Revolution was quickly followed by promises of entirely different treatment based on racial equality, and after the Civil War there were sweeping political, administrative, and cultural changes in Asiatic Russia. It is, however, a mistake to think that in the matter of the Russian attitude towards the Muslim peoples of Asia the Revolution constituted a complete break with the past. To begin with, the Asiatic frontiers of the U.S.S.R. remained and still remain precisely the same as those of Imperial Russia; and no intelligent person in Soviet Asia or its borderlands has ever supposed the destinies of the Asian peoples of the Soviet Union to be in hands other than those of the Kremlin. Secondly, whereas during the first twenty years of the Soviet régime there was steady Soviet denunciation of the Tsarist conquest and exploitation of Asia, there has since developed, at first gradually but later more rapidly, an unmistakable tendency to rehabilitate the previous régime in so far as it was concerned with the Asian nationalities. A striking illustration of this can be found by comparing the long articles on colonies in the first and second editions of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*. The first, published in 1938, castigates Tsarist Russia at considerable length for cruelly exploiting her colonial possessions; the second, published in 1953, makes no mention of Russia ever having had any colonial possessions, and thus leaves her out of account in discussing the evils of colonialism.

A brief description of the six Muslim republics is given in

Appendix B. In such a study as the present one it is not possible to give a detailed account of the impact of the Revolution on these various national groups, important though it is. Here it will only be feasible to set forth the broad trend of events before proceeding to the main subject of the study—present-day racial problems in the eastern republics.

The problem presented to the Soviet leaders by their sudden inheritance of the Tsarist empire was formidable and many-sided. In the first place, the whole concept of empire ran counter to Communist theory; but the Tsarist empire happened to contain natural resources vital to the continued existence of the Russian State. Secondly, renunciation of the empire, or at any rate of the southern part of it which was relatively thickly populated by Asian peoples, would, according to Russian reckoning, have laid Central Asia and Transcaucasia open to attack by Britain, and thus have jeopardized Russia's security. Thirdly, there were in Central Asia and the Kazakh Steppe Region alone well over two million Russian settlers who, whether they supported the Revolution or not, considered this area to be an integral part of Russia which could not be lightly handed over to the backward indigenous population. Finally, Lenin was himself a Russian in whom, in spite of his international attitude, there was probably as strong a messianic strain as in any Tsarist statesman.

It was stated in the previous chapter that during the Tsarist period there were no distinct nationalist movements among the peoples of Asiatic Russia. This is not the view of Soviet historians: they claim that there had long been such movements and that they became particularly active during the 1905 Revolution. On the other hand, they minimize the cultural cohesion associated with Islam. It is in fact extremely doubtful whether nationalism is an appropriate description of the different stirrings and expressions of discontent which were manifest among the Asian peoples during the Tsarist period. Although literacy and political consciousness were confined to two or three per cent. of the

population, there was considerable cultural activity, a flourishing oral literature, and a growing interest in education. The most important movement was that known as *Jadidism* (from *usul-e-jadid*, or the new method) and it was cultural rather than political. It was a Muslim reformist movement initiated at the turn of the century by Ismail Gasprinskiy, a Crimean Tatar, and its main object was to bring Islamic culture into line with modern life by the establishment of 'new method' schools. The main fields of its activities were among the Tatars of the Volga Region and the Crimea, and in Azerbaydzhan; but it also had a considerable vogue in Turkestan, where there were 100 Jadid schools by 1915. There were also a number of other less important movements and societies, all with a more or less religious or cultural background.

The 'February' Revolution and the establishment of the Provisional Government were followed by the convening of various Muslim congresses throughout the empire. The idea of territorial autonomy was apparently first expressed at the so-called Kazakh-Kirgiz Congress held in Orenburg in April 1917. The Kazakhs, having suffered particularly heavily at the hands of the Russians during the suppression of the 1916 revolt, were more eager than any of the other Asian peoples to be rid of Russian rule and colonization. Shortly after, at the first All-Russian Muslim Congress convened at Moscow on 1 May 1917, it was agreed that 'the form of government which is most capable of protecting the interests of the Muslim peoples is a democratic republic based on national, territorial, and federal principles, with national-cultural autonomy for the nationalities which lack a distinct territory'. The participants in this and subsequent Muslim Congresses were mainly Russian-educated intellectuals who were more concerned with cultural than with political matters, were not necessarily in favour of separation from Russia, and were prepared to leave their political future to an All-Russian Constituent Assembly. It is noteworthy that at the so-called National Assembly (Milli

Majlis) convened in Ufa on 20 November 1917, that is, just after the 'October Revolution' of 7 November, only three Ministries were created—those of religion, education, and finance, these being the only spheres in which the Muslim peoples seemed at that stage to be seeking autonomy.

By the time the Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917, the Muslims of Russia had, entirely on their own initiative, moved some way towards unity on the broad basis of their common culture. Whatever may be the official Soviet version of the origin and nature of the nationalist movements, of which they claim that the Muslim Republics delimited in 1924 were the logical outcome, there can be no doubt that the first solution of the empire problem which occurred to the Soviet leaders was the plan of treating the Muslims as a cultural and even as a political entity. One of their first acts was to address in December 1917 a conciliatory appeal:

'Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirgiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and mountain Cossacks! All you, whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia! Henceforward your beliefs and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable! Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right. Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, will be protected by the might of the revolution, by the Councils of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies!'

The Commissariat of Nationalities, of which Stalin was the first Chairman, then proceeded to approach the various all-Russian Muslim organizations created since March 1917. So far as is known, no prominent position in these organizations was held by a Communist, the Chairman of the Executive Council being an Ossetin Menshevik, Ahmad Tsalikov. To him Stalin offered the chairmanship of a new

body to be called the Commissariat of Muslim Affairs. He refused, and the post was given to Mulla Nur Vakhitov, a Kazan Tatar, who under Stalin's direction speedily formed bureaux and committees throughout the Muslim areas, which superseded the organs of the all-Russian Muslim movement. In June 1918, Vakhitov formed the 'Russian Party of Muslim Communists'. This seemed to have the cautious blessing of Stalin, but when, shortly after, Vakhitov was executed by the Czechs in Kazan, it was dissolved, and the functions of its Central Committee were taken over by the Central Bureau of Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party. In March 1919 the words 'Muslim Organizations' were changed to 'Organizations of the Peoples of the East'. Shortly afterwards the Muslim Commissariat itself disappeared, and thus the whole concept of Islam was removed from the Soviet political fabric, never to return. Events had shown that the existence of a separate Muslim Communist Party was unlikely to ensure the adherence of the Muslims to the Russian state.

With the passing of the all-Russian Muslim movement and the new talk of nationalities and self-determination, political as distinct from cultural nationalism grew apace among the Russian Muslims. But it was what in Communist parlance is called 'bourgeois nationalism', that is to say it was less interested in the class war and socialism than in getting rid of foreign influence, and particularly of foreign settlers. This resulted in intense and unprecedented friction between the Muslims and the Russian colonists, especially in Central Asia, and by the end of 1919 the government of Turkestan, except for the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, was virtually in the hands of the colonists, with only nominal Muslim participation.

In areas such as Azerbaydzhan, Bashkiria, and Kazakhstan, where the native population was more or less homogeneous, distinct nationalist movements did emerge after the Revolution and resulted in brief periods of national government. In spite of fierce local resistance, several factors

contributed to the rapid liquidation of these movements and governments and to their eventual absorption in the Soviet Union: the Tsarist administration had not produced even a nucleus of a native civil service and not more than two or three per cent. of the population were literate; there was widespread internal dissension; something like chaos reigned in the neighbouring Muslim countries of Turkey and Persia, and foreign support was either non-existent or fleeting, as in the case of Turkish support in Azerbaydzhan; finally, the Revolution in metropolitan Russia quickly gathered momentum and soon swept forward with irresistible force—engulfing even those areas in which independence was a real possibility. The Azerbaydzhan Soviet Socialist Republic was established in 1920, and the so-called Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the same year, the name of the latter not being changed to Kazakh until 1925. In Turkestan and the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara the nationalist movements were much less coherent and successful. To the factors just mentioned were added the lack of homogeneity, the presence of a vast Russian colony and of some 90,000 released German and Austrian prisoners who made common cause with the Russians against the local population. By the end of 1919 Turkestan was virtually in the hands of the colonist Government in Tashkent, called since April 1918 the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkestan. The purely Muslim Government of Kokand had been liquidated by Russian military force in January 1918.

Disturbed at the way in which the potential sympathy of the peoples of Turkestan for the Soviet régime had been alienated, Lenin dispatched there the Turkestan Commission, which took over the authority of the Tashkent Government and brought into being a number of palliative measures designed to humour the Muslims. But resistance to the new régime was now widespread in the form of the Basmachi movement. This is sometimes represented as a positive Turkestani nationalist movement aiming at independence from Soviet Russian rule; but it is also possible

that it was more the despairing reaction of the people to inefficient and oppressive authority. When at last in 1922 the Turkestan Commission introduced a number of real reforms, the movement began to collapse. By this time the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara had become the Khorezmian and Bukharan 'People's Soviet Republics'; though they were under the control of Communists, they were described by Stalin in December 1922 as 'independent' and as outside the framework of the Soviet Union 'simply because they were not yet socialist'. In 1923 and 1924 they became the Khorezmian and Bukharan Soviet Socialist Republics.

In 1924 a fundamental delimitation of the administrative boundaries of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was resorted to, and by the end of the year the republics of Turkestan, Khorezm (Khiva), and Bukhara had been abolished and the whole area divided into the five republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. With some minor territorial adjustments this division still holds good today.

The year 1924 marks the beginning of the putting into practice of the nationalities policy, the essential features of which will be described in the next chapter; but some reference must be made here to the three chief manifestations of anti-Soviet attitude on the part of the Muslims of Russia. Two of these have already been mentioned—the Kokand Government and the Basmachi revolt; the third was the nationalist movements which culminated in that of 1937. In describing all these incidents Soviet historians invariably assert that they were the work of reactionary exploiting and clerical elements co-operating with foreign capitalists (at first these were confined to the British, but post-1945 history has extended the charge to include the Americans) against the will of the people. Participants in all three movements, on the other hand, claim that they were genuine nationalist uprisings against colonial government of precisely the same kind as uprisings in North Africa

and elsewhere, a view which is supported by the published resolutions of the Kokand Government and the Basmachi leaders. The resolution passed by the Second Turkestan Muslim Congress held in Samarkand in April 1922 is of particular interest. This resolution, the text of which was first published in a refugee journal in 1932, inveighs against both the Tsarist and Soviet régimes. 'The Russians in Turkestan, who have today adopted the name of Communists, began, once their authority had been proclaimed, to oppress the Turkestan Muslims even more severely than in the days of Nikolay. The Red Soviet troops set fire to towns and villages and robbed and plundered in a manner unparalleled and continue to do so.' Both régimes are charged with employing in Government business 'none but venal and treacherous persons'. The resolution also declares that 'should the Soviet Government not change its policy and grant peace, that is, should it not confirm the Muslims of Turkestan in a government of their own, enjoying the confidence of the people and suited to their living conditions; and should the Soviet Government not restore to them their political and cultural rights, we the Muslims of Turkestan, with or without arms, will wage war on the Soviet Government to the last drop of our blood.'

Although the Basmachi revolt was eventually suppressed by the Red Army and many of its leaders killed or executed, the Soviet Government did 'change its policy' in the sense that it realized that the Muslim population could not be bulldozed into submission and would have to be pacified by material concessions and a semblance of 'a government of their own'.

It is not easy to arrive at the facts of the 1937 movement in Uzbekistan. The Prime Minister, Faizullah Hoja, and the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Ikram were accused among other things of 'nationalism' and of being British agents, and were executed together with a number of their alleged supporters. They admitted having worked for the independence of Turkestan from Soviet rule,

but not to the charge of contacts with the British, of which no proof was forthcoming. Baymirza Hayit, the author of *Turkestan Im XX Jahrhundert*, himself an Uzbek, says that Faizullah had always been secretly working for separation from the Soviet Union; but it is nevertheless not entirely established whether a real plot existed or whether the arrests, trials, and executions were simply part of Stalin's Union-wide purge of Trotskyists, nationalists, and so-called enemies of the people.

In any event, there is at least a strong probability that there was up to the outbreak of the Second World War a strong undercurrent of nationalist, anti-Soviet, and anti-Russian feeling. During the War large numbers of Muslim prisoners and deserters declared their willingness to fight for the Germans against the Soviet Union, and Muslims of the Crimea and North Caucasus to the number of over half a million were deported from their homelands on the ground that they had collaborated with the German forces.

III. THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY

THE essential features of the nationalities policy have been obscured by propaganda—Soviet propaganda extolling it as a great and enlightened act of justice to the subject peoples of Imperial Russia, and anti-Soviet propaganda condemning it as a new and monstrous instrument of human enslavement. It is also possible to look at it as a hard-headed administrative expedient devised to meet certain unforeseen developments which followed the collapse of the Tsarist régime.

The pre-1917 Communist conception of self-determination more or less corresponded with nationalist aspirations in all colonial dominions. This conception was reaffirmed at the seventh All-Russian Party Congress held in April 1917 in a resolution which recognized four principles: the right of non-Russian nationalities to secede from Russia, regional autonomy for the nationalities remaining inside Russia, laws guaranteeing the rights of minorities, and the indivisibility of the Party. The only significant but seemingly reasonable qualification of these principles was made by Stalin when he said: 'the question of the *right* of nations freely to secede must not be confused with the notion that a nation must necessarily secede at any given moment . . . thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against secession, according to the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution'.

Immediately after the October Revolution there developed in the Russian borderlands a strong tendency towards decentralization: Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States detached themselves completely; and nationalist movements began in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The new régime was thus faced with the serious prospect of the disintegration

of the Russian state, and a redefinition of the principle of self-determination was accordingly required. Already in January 1918 Stalin had written that 'it is necessary to limit the principle of free self-determination of nations by granting it to the toilers and refusing it to the bourgeoisie'. Later, in November 1918, he explained in *Pravda* that the bourgeois nationalist movements had proved incapable of representing the workers and that 'the old bourgeois-democratic interpretation of the principle of self-determination had become a fiction and lost its revolutionary significance'. In fact, self-determination became an instrument of counter-revolution when it was directed against Soviet power. The matter was stated even more clearly by Trotskiy:

'We do not only recognize, but we also give full support to the principle of self-determination, whenever it is directed against feudal, capitalist, and imperialist states. But whenever the fiction of self-determination, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, becomes a weapon directed against the proletarian revolution, we have no occasion to treat this fiction differently from the other "principles" of democracy perverted by capitalism.'

There are indications that the enunciation of these principles caused Lenin misgiving as leading towards Greater Russian chauvinism. But they were in fact applied, and their application led to the rapid suppression of genuine nationalism in the Muslim borderlands, where the bourgeoisie were identifiable with the local population and the proletariat with the Russian settlers. Kalinin could declare openly in 1929 that the object of Soviet policy was 'to teach the people of the Kirgiz steppe, the small Uzbek cotton-growers and the Turkmen gardener to accept the ideals of the Leningrad worker'. This can easily be recognized as a standard imperialist utterance closely resembling the idea of 'the white man's burden'.

Whatever the real or imaginary need for moral justification, the Soviet leaders, Lenin included, undoubtedly felt

that the urgent need to reconsolidate the Russian empire outweighed all other considerations. Quite apart from the obvious danger of bourgeois nationalism, there were other more subtle but not less menacing possibilities. For instance, Sultan Galiyev, a Tatar Muslim Communist holding a high position in the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs, developed a movement which came to be regarded as a form of counter-revolution. This movement centred round a conviction that the exclusively German or Russian interpretation of Marxism was unsuited to the Muslim world, and that it would eventually become obscured by Greater Russian chauvinism. He aimed at modifying Marxism as conceived for the industrial West in order to render it applicable to the fundamentally agrarian society of Asia. Although a Communist, his ideas were bound up with Islamic tradition. His plan had several stages and was to begin with the creation of a Muslim state on the middle Volga, which he insisted on calling by its original Tatar name of Idel. To this state were to be joined, first the Turkic Muslims of Russia, and later all the other Russian Muslims. This Muslim state or federation was to organize the propagation of Communism in the non-Soviet east, and finally, to help 'colonial and semi-colonial' territories in establishing political domination over their metropolitan rulers. The considerable response accorded to Sultan Galiyev's movement in Central Asia and the Caucasus drew attention to its potential danger. In 1923 he was denounced, arrested, and dismissed from the Party. He ultimately disappeared and is believed to have been executed in 1930. Whatever the strength of Sultan Galiyev's following, his was the last expression of the all-Union Muslim point of view to appear in the U.S.S.R. Some people, and among them Mustafa Chokayev, president of the ill-fated Kokand Government of 1918, maintain that the 'plan of dividing Turkestan into tribal states', that is, the territorial redistribution of 1924, was the direct result of Sultan Galiyev's attempted 'counter-revolution'.

A clear and objective description of the Soviet nationalities policy is contained in Alexander Park's *Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917–1927*. The declared aim of the policy was what was called 'the liquidation of actual (fakticheskiy) inequality', and its essence was economic. It was believed that once inequality had been eliminated all bourgeois nationalist and separatist tendencies would disappear. If, as Park maintains, the policy was 'conceived in honesty' it quickly encountered realities which showed that it could not be made to correspond to the will of the people, however much it might contribute to their ultimate material good. In the first place the minute native intelligentsia, which alone had the necessary education and political consciousness to qualify for administrative and political activity, were stigmatized as the 'exploiting' class, and therefore excluded from politics. Secondly, the Soviet tendency to prefer the 'proletariat' to the peasantry, although it had little significance for nationalities policy in western Russia, had unfortunate results in the Muslim borderlands, where the politically conscious industrial proletarian minority was mainly Russian and Ukrainian, that is European, and the peasant majority Asian. This tended to perpetuate and even to extend the colonialist concept of enlightened European tutelage over backward native peoples.

The Soviet leaders were no doubt well aware of the contradictions which were developing between Soviet ideals and hard reality. Lenin in particular frequently inveighed against the danger of Greater Russian chauvinism. He may have believed that education and administrative training would eventually result in complete 'korenizatsiya', a new word whose literal rendering is 'nativization', but although the training of native cadres was begun in the 1920s, it proceeded very slowly; for instance, in Kazakhstan by 1930 only 26·5 per cent. of all clerical posts were held by Kazakhs. In the meanwhile, Soviet Russian standards and procedures had been adopted and the whole administration so russianized that it could not be 'nativized' merely by

introducing more and more Russian-trained indigenous personnel.

There were other all-Union institutions which inevitably made for centralization and russianization: Muslims, most of whom had previously been exempt from conscription, were now drafted into the preponderantly Russian Red Army; various planning, construction, and youth organizations were conceived on an all-Union basis, and their membership cut across national boundaries. Finally, the greatest instrument of centralization, the Party, was, after the first outburst of international fervour, to become more and more susceptible to the mystique of Russian traditionalism and nationalism, which had never really disappeared from Russian life. The discrediting in 1937 of Pokrovskiy's theory of history which condemned the Tsarist conquests and annexations as 'an absolute evil' was the beginning of a long process tending towards the rehabilitation of the Tsarist régime and of Russia's historical civilizing mission as a mentor of backward peoples. It was the Party which developed, and is still propagating this idea. A conference on the subject of the positive advantages accruing from the union with Russia was held in Tashkent during 1959.

Viewed dispassionately and without regard to the high-sounding moral and ethical claims for and denunciations of it made by supporters and opponents of the Soviet régime, the Soviet nationalities policy appears simply as a new and materially more efficient form of colonialism. It is the outcome not so much of Communist theory and practice as of the reaction of certain elemental forces to a given situation. The origins of these forces lie deep in Russian history and geography; the given situation was the sudden inheritance of an empire acquired by force, whose abandonment seemed certain to involve the disintegration of the Russian state. As a practical means of avoiding such disintegration and as a temporary administrative expedient for preserving the Russian state and perpetuating central control, the policy has much to be said for it. As a temporary practical

expedient it could, indeed, be regarded as the best one in the circumstances, for the sudden abdication of paramount power over backward peoples unprepared for independence may prove a worse evil than its original imposition. Whether the Soviet nationalities policy can be said to constitute a permanent and ethical solution of the colonial problem and whether it has been applied with due regard to the will or spiritual requirements of the peoples concerned are entirely different but by no means less important questions.

The various political, economic, and cultural steps taken to promote the application of the nationalities policy will be described in later chapters.

IV. THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT

It has already been made clear that this study is concerned with the Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R. and mainly with those in the six Union republics, that is, Azerbaydzhan, Kazakhstan, and the four republics of Soviet Central Asia. What follows is a necessarily brief description of the peoples inhabiting these six republics with an even briefer reference to the Muslims in the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics, who only make up less than one-quarter of the total Muslim population of the U.S.S.R., of approximately twenty millions.

Without going into any anthropological detail, it may be said that nine-tenths of the Muslims of the U.S.S.R. are of Turkic origin, although the only real determinant of their origin is linguistic. The second largest group is Iranian, the Tajiks accounting for nearly one million. The Chechens of the North Caucasus, a people of doubtful racial origin, who numbered about 400,000 at the 1939 census, come third, the residue being made up of much smaller groups, including a few thousand Arabs.

The early history of the Turkic peoples is shrouded in obscurity, the first mention of Turks of any kind being in Chinese chronicles of the sixth century. The original population of Azerbaydzhan and Central Asia was probably Iranian, but was several times overrun by Turkic or other Mongoloid peoples, for example, by the Karakhanids and Seljuks in about A.D. 1000 and by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The last Turkic people whose rulers possessed any semblance of paramount power in Central Asia were the Uzbeks, who were defeated by the Persians at the end of the sixteenth century. Thereafter, until the

boundary delimitation of 1924, there is virtually no history or even record of the *peoples* of Central Asia but only of kingdoms and dynasties whose names bore no relation to the people who lived in or under them.

The Tsarist administration took little account of national or even of tribal distinctions, preferring to use loose generic, and often quite incorrect, terms. Thus they called the Azerbaydzanis Tatars and the Kazakhs Kirgiz. They also devised an artificial word *tyurki* for people of Turkic origin who are not natives of Turkey, the latter being called *turki*. The Soviet administration, on the other hand, pays particular attention to the names of nationalities, and it eschews the Western concept of nationalism as primarily associated with territory.

A prominent characteristic of the population of Central Asia before the coming of the Russians, and indeed up to the Revolution, was its broad division between the steppe (and desert) region and the oasis region, and thus between nomadic and settled societies. During the thirty-five years which elapsed from the final subjugation of the oasis region to the Revolution this situation changed very little. The Soviet régime, however, has made great efforts to stabilize the nomads. This, coupled with the extensive colonization of the Steppe Region by Russians and the growth of industrialization, has resulted in the blurring of the sharp division between steppe and oasis and also in an enormous increase in the urban population.

The peoples of the six Muslim republics not only have strong cultural affinities with the peoples living in the borderlands of adjoining non-Soviet states but are in a large degree identical with them. Thus, there are four million Azerbaydzhanis and 200,000 Turkmens in Persia, one million Uzbeks and two million Tadzhiks in Afghanistan, and half a million Kazakhs in what is now the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region of China.

The following statistical information on the Muslim population of Russia is largely confined to Central Asia,

which contains the greatest concentration of Muslims (about three-fifths of the total) and is the area, moreover, where the greatest changes have taken place. The available data are contained in the censuses of 1897, 1926, and 1939 (the findings of the 1959 census were not available at the time of writing) and in certain official estimates published both before and after the Revolution. The difficulty of compiling accurate population statistics in an area where, at any rate until 1926, a large part of the population was tribal and nomadic is obvious. Moreover, since the first census taken in 1897 there have been a number of changes and upheavals which affected the population; these phenomena include the migration of Russians into the area during Stolypin's administration (1905–11), the 1916 revolt, the Revolution and the Civil War, the migrations of the collectivization period (1928–32), the evacuations and deportations carried out during the Second World War, and the settlement plan incident on the Kazakhstan grain drive, which is still in progress.

The information available up to 1946 is incomplete, and even contradictory in certain respects. The 1897 census naturally did not include the large states of Khiva and Bukhara, which were then nominally independent. The 1926 census was based on ethnic groups (*narodnost'*) whereas the 1939 census was based on nationalities (*natsional'nost'*).[1] Although this may be a distinction without a difference, since the words *narodnost'* and *natsional'nost'* appear to be synonymous, it seems to have resulted in the omission from the 1939 census of many small ethnic groups included in the 1926 census as located in Central Asia, presumably because they were too small to be regarded as nationalities. The publication of the full findings of the 1939 census was interrupted by the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the Second World War, and all its results may never have been made publicly available. Recent Soviet publications (for example, the

[1] It may be mentioned here that the word *rasa* (race) very seldom occurs in Soviet writing except in a pejorative sense.

economic geographies of all the republics except Kirgizia published during 1956 and 1957) give more details of the relative ethnic proportions in the populations without, however, giving actual numbers. The following table gives the number of the principal nationalities in 1926 and 1939 to the nearest hundred thousand. The 1926 census listed eight other minor groups totalling 200,000. Details of these groups for 1939 are not available, but they must be presumed to be still in existence.

	1926	*1939*
Kazakhs	4,000,000	3,100,000
Uzbeks	3,900,000	4,800,000
Kirgiz	800,000	900,000
Turkmens	800,000	800,000
Tadzhiks	1,000,000	1,200,000
Kara-Kalpaks	100,000	200,000
	10,600,000	11,000,000
Total population (i.e., including settlers and minor groups totalling about 200,000)	13,800,000	16,600,000

The 1897 census gave the population of 'Turkestan and the Asiatic Steppes' (i.e., part of the area now under review except for the Orenburg region detached in 1925) as 7,747,000, to which must be added the population of the then independent states of Bukhara and Khiva, estimated at 2,175,000, giving a total of 9,922,000. No detailed figures of non-Asian settlers were given, but the total of these was certainly less than ten per cent. of the native population.

In 1911 official population estimates were published showing a total population for the same area of 12,502,000, made up of 10,551,000 natives and 1,951,000 settlers described as Russians. An estimate in 1914 gave the total population as 13,279,000.

The 1926 census showed an increase on the 1914 estimates of only about half a million in the total population. By comparison with the 1926 census, the 1939 census showed an increase of about three millions in the total population, that is, sixteen and a half millions against thirteen and a half

millions, but apparently of only half a million in the native population, or even less.

The main conclusion to be derived from the available data is that between 1926 and 1939, whereas the native population increased by, at the most liberal reckoning, five per cent., the non-native population increased by seventy-two per cent. The accuracy of information on trends before 1926 is to some extent qualified by the absence of any precise figures for the states of Khiva and Bukhara, and of ethnic details of the population detached from Kazakhstan in 1925. From the available figures, however, it seems that the native population of the whole area did not increase by more than 503,000 or four per cent. between 1911 and 1939, while the increase in the total population during the same period was 4,124,000 or thirty-three per cent., and in the non-native population 3,622,000 or approximately 186 per cent. The most remarkable change in any single ethnic group—and one which has not been officially explained—was the fall in the total of Kazakhs from 3,968,300 in 1926 to 3,098,800 in 1939.

If the Kazakhs are excluded a somewhat different picture emerges. The total population of the four republics was 7,700,000 in 1926 and 10,500,000 in 1939, an increase of 2,800,000. The native population was six and a half millions in 1926 and eight millions in 1939, an increase of one and a half millions. This shows an increase of about twenty-five per cent. in the native population and of over 100 per cent. in the non-native population.

In 1956 three official publications—*National Economy of the U.S.S.R.*, *Cultural Structure of the U.S.S.R.*, and *Soviet Trade*—appeared, which, although they give no breakdown by ethnic groups, provide a good deal of information about the population of the Muslim republics in general. The most striking changes are observed in Kazakhstan, whose numbers rose from 6,146,000 in 1939 to 8,500,000 in 1956—an increase of 2,354,000, and in Kirgizia, which increased from 1,459,000 to 1,900,000—a rise of 441,000. Uzbekistan rose

from 6,282,000 to 7,300,000 in 1956—an increase proportionately smaller than that of Kirgizia, although actually larger in number. The least important increases have occurred in Tadzhikistan (1939—1,485,000 and 1956—1,800,000), and in Turkestan (1939—1,254,000 and 1956—1,400,000). Azerbaydzhan rose from 3,200,000 in 1939 to only 3,400,000 in 1956.

The present extent and effect of the colonization of the territory of the six Muslim republics by Russians are matters which cannot easily be determined. Since 1939 it has become progressively more difficult to calculate the relative proportions of natives and non-natives, and even before that exact information about the extent of the various migrations and the location of settlers was not forthcoming. According to the 1956 figures, the present total population of the six republics is about twenty-four millions, of whom about seven millions are estimated to be non-native and predominantly Slav, that is, Russian and Ukrainian. The non-natives therefore exceed the most numerous indigenous people, the Uzbeks, whose number was estimated in 1939 as 4,800,000 and is now probably well over five millions. The seven million white settlers are not evenly distributed, at least three millions of them being in Kazakhstan alone. According to official figures, there are only sixteen per cent. Russians in Azerbadzhan and eleven per cent. in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, in the Tashkent oblast (province) of Uzbekistan, probably the most highly industrialized area in the whole region, twenty-nine per cent. of the population is Russian.

The deportations carried out during the Second World War have already been mentioned as one of the factors affecting the population of Central Asia. The principal of these deportations were from the Volga Region, the North Caucasus, and the Crimea, and they involved altogether about one million Asians. Of these about 800,000 were Muslims and the remainder Kalmyks and others. The Muslim peoples involved were the Chechens (408,000),

Crimean Tatars (202,000), Ingush (92,000), Karachay (76,000), and Balkar (43,000). Full details of the deportations have never been published, but it appears that in 1944 the various Autonomous Republics and Provinces bearing these peoples' names were 'liquidated' and the people deported to an unknown destination on the ground that they had co-operated with the Germans during their advance into the Caucasus. No news of their fate was available until 1955, and in the meanwhile they were regarded as non-existent. Except in the volumes appearing after 1956, their names were not included in the second edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* as having ever existed or played any part in history, except in the final supplementary volume published in 1958. In 1955 mention was made in the Central Asian Press of Ingush and Chechen communities near Taldy-Kurgan in Kazakhstan, but no details were given. In February 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress these deportations were described as a crime against humanity and attributed to Stalin. Rehabilitation was promised and the names of some of the liquidated peoples reintroduced into the administration division of the North Caucasus in an ukaz of January 1957.

The location of the peoples involved is still not clear. After the deportation of the largest community, the Chechens and Ingush, the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic was reconstituted as the Groznyy oblast. The population of the Republic had been 697,000 in 1939, of whom 197,000 were non-natives, presumably Russians. In 1956, before repatriation could have been carried out, the population of the Groznyy oblast was given as 565,000, while in 1958 the population of the reconstituted Autonomous Republic was given as 544,000. In neither case was any clue given to the national composition, and no comprehensive information has been published about the progress of repatriation or about how the interim population was disposed of. S. A. Tokarev's *Ethnography of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.* (1958) mentions the existence of 408,000 Chechens (the 1939

census) as living 'along the right bank tributaries of the rivers Sunzha and Terek, partly in the mountains, partly in the foothills, and partly in the plains'. There has never been any mention of the 202,000 Crimean Tatars since 1944. Their Autonomous Republic was not reconstituted and their whereabouts remains unknown.

The political impact of the Soviet régime on the Muslim population has been very pronounced. Before the Revolution, and for a short while afterwards, the administrative and judicial systems retained many traditional features even in the areas under direct Russian control. After the delimitation of 1924, however, the Muslim republics were quickly made to conform to the standard Soviet systems. The presence of large numbers of Russian settlers in every walk of life has naturally resulted in a high proportion of Russians in all representative bodies. In some important instances, however, the number of Russian representatives seems to be out of proportion to the Russian element in the population. Thus, while according to the 1939 census the relative proportions of Russians and Uzbeks in the population of Uzbekistan is eleven per cent. and sixty-five per cent. respectively, the proportion of Russian and Uzbek delegates at the Uzbekistan Party Congress of 1956 was 213 Russians to 486 Uzbeks. But the increase in the Russian population of Uzbekistan since 1939 is unlikely to have been more than two or three per cent. Similar proportions in the Party Congress delegates emerge in the statistics for other republics wherever these are published. None have appeared in reports of recent Kazakhstan Party Congresses, but in the latest list of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party nearly two-thirds of the names are Russian or Ukrainian. So far the post of First or Second Secretary of the Party in every republic has been held by a non-native, usually a Russian. The overwhelming majority of the members of the Councils of Ministers are always native, but the Chairman of the Committee of State Security has so far always been non-native and usually Russian.

V. THE CULTURAL IMPACT

With the exception of the Tatars, the impact of Russian culture on the Asian nationalities of Russia before the Revolution was not great, nor does there appear to have been any considered plan for extending it. The Tatar khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan were incorporated in the Russian empire in the middle of the sixteenth century and were not in fact regarded as part of 'Asiatic Russia'. Although Kazan remained for a long while a centre of Muslim and distinctive Tatar culture, the Tatars early became to a great extent integrated with the Russians. Many families with surnames of obvious Muslim and Arabic origin, such as Rakhmaninov and Hakimov, have Russian first names and patronymics and are regarded and regard themselves as Russians to all intents and purposes.

The Crimean Tatars originally formed with the Kazan Tatars part of the Golden Horde. But they were not formally annexed to Russia until 1783, and the degree of their russianization was accordingly much less. They remained a sufficiently distinct non-Russian community to be deported *en masse* from the Crimea in 1944 and nothing has been heard of them since.

Among the other Muslim communities of Transcaucasia and Central Asia the spread of Russian culture before the Revolution was virtually confined to the literate few, that is, to not more than about five per cent. of the whole Muslim population excluding the Tatars. Since very few Russians learnt local languages, a smattering of colloquial Russian was common among native town-dwellers, and a limited number of Russian words for hitherto unknown objects and institutions found their way into the vernaculars. The great majority of Muslims were exempt from military service, and

intercourse of any kind between Russians and Asians was restricted. A few Muslims received a Russian education, and these as well as others, such as merchants who had dealings with the Russians, often added the Russian suffix *ov* or *ev* to their names. There seems to be no parallel to this phenomenon in other colonial empires, partly perhaps because the existence of such characteristic suffixes in other languages is comparatively rare.

The attitude of Tsarist governments towards Islam was on the whole lenient, and at times they even encouraged it among peoples such as the Kazakhs, who themselves regarded it with indifference. Local administrators and military commanders, however, looked upon Islam with hostility and apprehension. In particular, they regarded the esoteric Sufi sects as a menace to Russian authority.

Whereas the Tsarist attitude towards the Russian Muslims was, broadly speaking, one of indifference and *laisser faire*, the Soviet authorities have from the Revolution onwards been intent on moulding them to the requirements of the State. Soviet leaders have always condemned what they describe as the Tsarist policy of russianization, but the policy which they themselves have pursued has involved a far higher degree of russianization than that achieved or contemplated before the Revolution, even though that may not have been its original purpose. The declared goal is a culture which is national in form but Socialist in content. Since, however, the driving force behind the Revolution was and is Russian, and since the cultural and mental superiority of the Russians over all the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. is constantly affirmed almost as an article of faith, russianization seems to be inevitable. There is, nevertheless, some difference of opinion about this matter: while most Muslim refugees from the U.S.S.R. insist that the process is one of russianization, some Russian refugees say that it is not genuine Russian culture which is being inculcated but Soviet culture. This latter view could only be accepted if, as some people undoubtedly hold, Christianity—and in particular

Orthodox Christianity—is regarded as an inseparable part of Russian culture. All pre-Revolutionary attempts—at no time very determined—to spread Christianity among the Muslims were, of course, abandoned in 1917.

Broadly speaking, the attitude of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party towards Islam as a religion is the same as their attitude towards other religions, that is to say, they do not actively suppress it, but strongly discourage and ridicule it, although in less violent terms than formerly. A nominal but officially appointed religious hierarchy is allowed to exist, but it has no power, and every effort is made to restrict its influence by the counter-attraction of secular education and materialism.

It is often asserted that Islam is still a living force among the people of the Muslim republics, that it sustains them in their enforced subjection to the Soviet régime, and that in certain circumstances it would unite them in achieving real independence. It is difficult to say how far this is true today. Although Islam has proved a stronger cultural influence than any other in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, its beliefs and even its practice never took real root among a large part of the population, and particularly among the Kazakhs and Kirgiz. It can hardly be taken for granted that Islam is any more ingrained in the hearts and minds of the Muslims of the U.S.S.R. than it is in other parts of the Muslim world where its practice is not discouraged, but where it has failed to withstand the advance of westernization and where religious movements are often little more than political movements in disguise.

Although there has been some lessening of the cruder forms of anti-Islamic propaganda in recent years, the Soviet authorities make no concealment of their hostility to Islam. Indeed, as a way of life Communism regards Islam as more dangerous and objectionable than any branch of Christendom. It sees it as backward, as militating against material progress, and as having been promoted and perpetuated first by feudal eastern potentates and by imperialists, for

their own ends. The incompatibility of the Islamic with the Soviet way of life has been stated and restated over and over again, and early attempts by Soviet Orientalists to suggest that Communism and Islam have something in common have been unequivocally condemned.

The main antipathy of the Soviet authorities to Islam is on materialist grounds: they see it less as an ideological opponent of the Communist creed than as an obstacle to the establishment of Russian cultural and economic influence. The special suspicion of the Sufi sects, which they have inherited from their Tsarist predecessors, is perhaps due to their fear of them as a possible vehicle of secret communication among anti-Soviet elements, of whose final liquidation they are by no means sure.

In general, the process which the Russians are applying to Islam is somewhat different from that which they are applying to language, education, the arts, literature, and more recently, to historiography. They seek to russianize the latter, but Islam they wish to destroy altogether.

It is clear that the Soviet régime regards linguistic regimentation as one of the most important instruments in the moulding of the new society. Before the Revolution the languages of Central Asia had been affected in certain respects by other languages. The Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries resulted in the adoption of the Arabic script and later in the infusion of a large Perso-Arabic loan vocabulary into the Turkic languages, particularly into Uzbek and Turkmen. The Russian conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gave currency to a limited number of Russian words for concrete objects hitherto unknown, and of Russian words and expressions relating to administration. During the nineteenth century some Ottoman Turkish literature found its way into Transcaucasia and Turkestan and was studied by the literate few. This did not, however, produce any noticeable effect on languages, except perhaps on Azerbaydzhani.

None of the successive dominations by Arabs, Persians,

Mongols, or Tsarist Russians were accompanied by anything approaching a linguistic policy, that is to say, an attempt to change and regulate by legislation established languages or the methods of writing them. Linguistic policies may be of two kinds. There is the policy initiated by the government of a country in order to change or develop national language in accordance with national requirements. These often include the dropping of foreign accretions and the adoption of new and more practical scripts and orthographies. Examples of this are the policies adopted by Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and the orthographical reform of Russian introduced after, but devised before, the Revolution. There is also the policy which seeks to compel subject alien peoples either to abandon their own languages in favour of another or to change them in certain specified ways. The only instances of a ruling power forcing or attempting to force a subject people to abandon their own language in favour of that of the rulers seems to have been in Korea, where the Japanese forbade the teaching of Korean in schools, and in Poland, where the Russians for a time banned Polish from the primary schools except for religious instruction to non-Orthodox pupils.

Soviet linguistic policy has passed through several phases, and its trend has not always been consistent. Indeed, modifications in various languages are constantly being introduced. Three basic aims have, however, been declared throughout: first, 'the "completion" and "enrichment" of existing languages, the widening of their scope and the transformation of tribal and community languages into developed national languages with a rich terminology and vocabulary'; secondly, the removal of the large Arabic and Persian loan vocabulary inherited from the Muslim conquests; and thirdly, the establishment of Russian as 'a second native language'. These aims if achieved would have the effect of preventing the formation of a single Turkic literary language which might aid in the creation of a united Turkic and Muslim national movement, and of the Russian language being

used by all sections of the population. It is reasonable to suppose that it is precisely these effects at which Soviet linguistic policy aims, its method being to emphasize dialectal, phonetic and grammatical differences among the vernacular languages and to confer the status of distinct literary languages on local variants of the same languages. The spread of Russian is fostered by the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet for all languages used by Muslims and of a large Russian loan vocabulary, by the introduction of Russian grammatical and syntactical features and by compulsory Russian language instruction in the schools.

The effort expended on furthering the Soviet linguistic policy is enormous. There are school-books, grammars, and dictionaries for every language, a large part of Russian literature and most of the Communist classics have been translated into the vernaculars, and there is a growing if artificial literature in each of them. There are also newspapers and magazines of every description.

Of the actual effect of the policy it is difficult to speak with precision. Pipes's opinion is as follows:

'The linguistic situation in Central Asia closely resembles that prevailing in other areas of the world, where ancient but technologically retarded civilizations enter into contact with Western culture. This contact results in two parallel developments: the upper classes of the native population acquire the language of the nearest exponent of Western culture, to use as a medium of cultural advancement, and, at the same time, the local language is developed into a flexible tool of modern communication. In the Soviet Union the former process is strongly encouraged, the latter discouraged. There is no evidence to indicate that the Soviet régime actually succeeds in hindering the development of the native languages. Nor is there any indication of linguistic assimilation; on the contrary, all signs point to a remarkable ability of the local languages to survive in the face of strong pressures.'

There are some curious anomalies and inconsistencies in the application of the linguistic policy. In June 1953 a decree was promulgated which stipulated that in future *all* Russian words introduced into the Kirgiz language would be spelt exactly as in Russian, that is, not according to Kirgiz phonetics, as had hitherto been done for words taken into the language before the Revolution. This practice appears to be followed in Kazakh, Karakalpak, and Turkmen, all of whose alphabets are provided with all the letters of the Russian alphabet as well as some additional ones. But the Azerbaydzhani alphabet has always lacked some of the Russian letters, and from the beginning of 1959 two more have been dropped and some other radical orthographical changes introduced. The result is that Russian words used in Azerbaydzhani are now barely recognizable as such and no longer serve as the one feature in common with all other Union languages using the Cyrillic character. This phenomenon may be connected with the fact that the languages of Azerbaydzhani's two neighbours, Georgia and Armenia, still preserve their own character. The progressive tendency to break away from Russian may have some other political significance.

Although it would probably be more correct to describe the system of education in the eastern republics as Soviet rather than Russian, there can be no doubt of the strong emphasis placed on Russian language and culture, particularly in higher education. In the so-called Middle School (first to tenth or first to eighth classes) local languages are the medium of instruction; but the Russian language and what is tantamount to Russian literature and history are compulsory subjects and are taught in Russian.

No statistics are available which show the relative proportions of Russian and native teachers. The probability is that the majority of Middle School teachers are natives. In the higher educational establishments (*Vuz*), however, the reverse is more likely. For instance, official statistics for 1956 gave the total of the teaching staff in the *Vuz* of Azerbaydz-

han as 2,358. At the same time the total of Azerbaydzhanis employed throughout the U.S.S.R. as 'nauchnyye rabotniki' —a category which according to the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* includes both *Vuz* teaching staff and research workers of all kinds—was given as 2,779, while the total of 'nauchnyye rabotniki' in Azerbaydzhan was given as 4,388. Even supposing that all the Azerbaydzhanis in this category are working in their own republic, which is most unlikely, it follows that they must be very poorly represented either in the *Vuz* or in research establishments, or even in both. The position in the other Muslim republics is much the same. There is no definite information about the medium of instruction in the *Vuz*, but it is almost certain to be Russian.

Soviet statistics relating to literacy and the numbers of children receiving their education in Russian or in native languages do not distinguish between Russians and natives. In most instances the percentage of children receiving their education in Russian is higher than the known percentage of Russians in the population. Thus, in Kazakhstan sixty-six per cent. of the children are taught in Russian and in Kirgizia forty-nine per cent.

Over ninety per cent. of literacy is claimed for the Muslim republics. Even allowing for some exaggeration and for the fact that the population includes some seven million Russians, the progress in education has been remarkable and the standard of literacy is far higher than in the great majority of the countries of the Middle East and South Asia.

The type of education provided is a complete breakaway from Muslim tradition, but no more so than in many Muslim countries outside the U.S.S.R., where religious instruction may be optional or even dropped from the curriculum altogether. A considerable degree of compulsion was necessary in the early years of the Revolution. Truancy is still a problem, and the persistence of child marriage often interferes with girls' education. But by and large, it seems that the educational facilities offered are eagerly sought after.

Sustained efforts have been made to remould the arts on

Soviet and in effect on Russian lines. The drama, the opera, and the cinema, previously unknown in Central Asia and known only to a minor extent in Azerbaydzhan, have been greatly developed, almost exclusively on Russian models and making great use of Russian and Western themes. Where local languages are the medium this innovation has proved very popular, and it has given a fillip to the development of traditional themes. At one time the use for this purpose of such national epics as the Kirgiz *Manas* was discouraged by the authorities, but there is now more indulgence in this respect.

In so far as pictorial art has developed at all, it has done so on Russian lines. The introduction of political portraiture into carpet-weaving must be attributed to Soviet rather than to Russian influence. Some advance has been made in the systematization and notation of music, and there seem to have been some attempts to introduce Russian musical themes. On the whole, however, native idioms have not been interfered with.

It is on literature that the Russian impact has been greatest. Traditional literature was for the most part oral and dealt with epic and romantic themes. The Soviet aim is to create in local languages literatures which reflect the lives and cultures of the various nationalities but which conform to a standard Soviet, and usually Russian, pattern in subject matter, spirit, and in style. This standardization extends to every literary medium, with the possible exception of poetry. Thus there is no difference except that of language between the modern Press, novels, drama, history, and political literature of Azerbaydzhan and those of Western Russia or of, say, Kirgizia. The novel, a medium quite foreign to native tradition, is the principal vehicle for imaginative literature and is still firmly geared to political and economic requirements. The most usual themes are life in industry and the collective farms, and the past and present iniquities of Russia's internal and external enemies. At times great emphasis has been laid on the value of Russian friendship and

on the individual qualities of Russians. But attempts by some Muslim writers to overdo this have sometimes been strongly criticized. Similarly, the notion that Russians living among Muslims could or should become identified with them is not approved. For example, the Turkmen writer Ata Kaushutov was criticized for introducing into one of his stories a Russian officer living among the Turkmens who discarded his Russian name, sang Turkmen songs, and even acquired a swarthy complexion and the characteristic Turkmen boil.

How far this regimented literature is appreciated by the Asian nationalities it is difficult to say, but since, apart from selected translations, mostly from the Russian classics, it is the only literature available, it stands to reason that it must be read to a considerable extent. Modern Turkish and Persian literature, which would in any event require translation or transliteration, does not find its way into the Soviet Union. Some of the classical Turkish and Persian poets, such as Fuzuli, Nizami, and Rudaki, are called Azerbaydzhani or Tajik poets, but their works are no more read than they are in Turkey or Persia.

The writing and rewriting of history form an important part of Soviet cultural policy all over the U.S.S.R., and not least in the eastern republics. The original Soviet attitude towards the history of the Tsarist Asian empire was that expounded by Pokrovskiy, the first Marxist historian. He had described the incorporation into the empire of adjacent non-Russian peoples as an 'absolute evil' (*absolyutnoye zlo*). In 1937 this notion was abandoned and a decree was published which laid down, among other things, that the term 'absolute evil' was inappropriate in view of the collateral benefits conferred on the incorporated peoples by their association with the superior culture of the Russian people. Thenceforward, the so-called 'doctrine of the lesser evil' was propagated. This was based on the theory that the lot of the Central Asians would have been much worse if the Russians had never appeared and had left them to the mercy of the British

or Germans. The idea of Russian superiority was greatly fostered during the War, and in 1951 it developed into the notion that any use of the word 'evil' was inappropriate, since the results of the Russian conquest were, on balance, 'good'. At this time there was a tendency to abandon the word 'conquest' (*zavoyevaniye*) altogether and to substitute the expression 'voluntary union'. Historians who spoke of 'conquest' and 'colonization' by the Russians were strongly condemned. During 1955 articles began to appear which even went so far as to praise Russian pre-Revolutionary administration, and attacks on feudal and nomadic society were intensified. During 1956 there was another change: writers who devoted too much attention to the benefits of the Russian connexion were criticized and called upon to examine more closely the inherent national genius of Asian peoples. Some famous rebels against Russian authority, who had at first been extolled as heroes of their people, were later found to be reactionary. In 1956 there was a tendency to rehabilitate such people as Shamil, the redoubtable Caucasian who had defied Russian rule in the 1830s. In general, however, the main trend since 1937 has been towards the re-establishment of the Russian mystique, the notion that apart from occasional lapses by Russia's rulers, induced mostly by foreign intrigue, Russia's attitude towards Asian peoples, both inside her borders and beyond them, has been right and beneficial.

VI. SOCIAL CONTACTS

SOVIET writers on sociological conditions in the eastern republics of the Union represent the relationship between the local population and the Russians as one of friendly equality. They speak of the love which the Muslims have felt for the Russian people ever since they first came into contact with them. In earlier writing a sharp distinction was drawn between the Russian people and the Tsarist Russian administration, but recently there has been progressively less emphasis on this and the present tendency is to depict a state of mutual affection and confidence between Russians and Muslims and an age-long respect among the Muslims for everything Russian.

A careful examination of Soviet writing of all kinds, and of the personal inquiries made among refugees and during visits to the eastern republics by competent observers, suggests that the actual situation falls a good deal short of Soviet claims and wishes. Richard Pipes, who has conducted much research among refugees and has also made an extensive tour of Central Asia, reports as follows:

'The Russians who migrate to Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russian influx, therefore, resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, but a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance, and covers the regions which are most thinly inhabited. It thus splits the population into two distinct parts, neither of which loses its national complexion. In the rural areas, Russian and native collective farms exist side by side, but they do not merge: ethnically mixed Russo-Moslem *kolkhozy* (collective

farms) seem to be of great rarity. In the towns, the Russians and other westerners continue to inhabit the separate "European towns", located apart from the native quarters. The new "Soviet" town sections, erected by the régime to house the offices and employees of the vast Communist bureaucracy, are ethnically mixed, but they house only a small segment of the native population, namely a part of its urban intelligentsia. All evidence indicates that the Moslem and Russian populations on the whole continue to reside apart from each other.

'This residential separation of the two groups is made more significant by the lack of extensive social contact between them. Refugee as well as Soviet sources indicate the almost complete absence of intermarriage. It is hindered in part by the strong control exercised by Moslem parents over their daughters, but mainly by enormous cultural gaps separating Russians from Moslems. Occasional intermarriage occurs among those elements of the local population who, for one reason or another, have been cut off from the body of their co-nationals, e.g. persons who have no families or those who have returned from long incarceration in prisons or concentration camps; it seems to involve only Moslem males. Even this, however, is so rare as to have no effect on the ethnic makeup of Central Asia. There is also evidence that the social intercourse between the two groups is very limited. Moslems and Russians meet at work, but rarely outside of it. Moslem refugees who had experience of common employment with Russians were virtually unanimous in stating that they did not maintain social relations with their colleagues after working hours.'

The foregoing was written in 1954, and in all probability represents the situation as it is today and as it has been ever since Russian settlement on a large scale began. It does not reflect any particular discredit on the Russians—the reluctance to intermingle is, indeed, on the native rather than on the Russian side; nor does it indicate any special distaste in

the Muslim mind for Russian or Soviet civilization. It is simply the result of a clash of differing civilizations in a typically colonial society. The bitterness with which the Russians resent this suggestion and the lengths to which they go to repudiate it strongly point to their consciousness of its truth.

The strenuous efforts made by the Soviet régime to remodel society on different lines and to bring about a real fusion of peoples do not so far seem to have had much effect. In this connexion, the many field studies carried out by Soviet sociologists and ethnographers are of great interest although they are rarely studied in the West. These show that the tribal and clan systems remain at their most exclusive precisely in those areas where Russian colonization has been most extensive. Thus in 1950 a Kazakh kolkhoz in the Dzhambul oblast consisted of 116 families. Of these thirteen were of Azerbaydzhani immigrants, two were Russian, and 100 Kazakh, all belonging to one tribal subdivision. Only one family belonged to another tribe and was regarded as 'foreign'.

Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, a keen student of conditions in the eastern republics and a recent visitor to Soviet Central Asia, has provided some important information about the impact of russianization on Muslim society. Although racial segregation is most marked in the rural districts, it still exists in the towns.

'With the exception of Alma-Ata and Stalinabad where the Russian and Muslim quarters are intermingled, and purely Muslim towns such as Kokand and Bukhara where the Russians are in the minority, most of the Central Asian towns exist in a double form—a native city and a Russian administrative city (where live also some "advanced" non-Russians).'

Confirming what Pipes has to say about intermarriage, Madame Carrère d'Encausse adds that there is no question of Muslim women being emancipated. This statement is con-

firmed in a large number of Soviet publications in spite of claims to the contrary contained in Soviet propaganda directed abroad. In the rare cases where Russian girls marry Muslim men they may be accepted into urban Muslim society but not into village society. The children of such marriages are invariably brought up as Muslims.

There is naturally some social contact between the communities in industry. Contrary to general belief, however, the native workers are often in a minority to the Russians, and in some instances this disparity seems to be increasing. Thus, in the old Kirgiz coal-mining district of Kyzyl Kiya founded in 1898, whereas in 1914 twenty-five per cent. of the workers were Kirgiz this percentage had fallen to twelve in 1954.

The intermingling of the communities in the Middle Schools is very limited except where Muslim children attend Russian schools. In some republics this may amount to about ten per cent.; it has not so far been possible to determine in what circumstances Muslim parents decide to have their children educated in Russian; but the early acquisition of a good knowledge of Russian would unquestionably improve their chances of professional advancement.

In the *Vuz* (higher educational establishments) and in the factory and trade schools there must be considerable inter-racial contact. In general Russians appear to be in the majority in these establishments. For instance, the *National Economy of the Turkmen S.S.R.* (Ashkhabad 1957) gives the total of students in the *Vuz* as 13,045, of whom only 4,752 were Turkmens, and of those in the technical schools and specialized secondary schools as 13,932, of whom 4,867 were Turkmens. (Allowance in the totals must, of course, be made for the ten or twelve per cent. of Uzbeks in the population of the Turkmen S.S.R.) Proportions in the other eastern republics seem to be much the same. There have been signs of discontent with these proportions on the part of the local population. For instance, a Party reproof was administered in January 1957 to the writer of an article in a Kazakh paper

which had declared that little or nothing was done for the higher training of national cadres. The reproof pointed out that the 1956–57 intake for *Vuz* and technical training establishments had included 43·8 per cent. Kazakhs.

In the great majority of cases the Muslims' first contact with the Russians occurs in the Army during the period of national service. In spite of widespread belief to the contrary, there are now no national formations whatsoever in the armed forces. Consequently, the Muslims are greatly in the minority and find themselves obliged to conform to a predominantly Russian way of life. Except in rare cases, however, the effect of this experience probably wears off very quickly after the soldier returns to his home.

Russian influence in material civilization is most noticeable in town planning and domestic housing. The very considerable building of new towns, settlements, and villages is almost exclusively on the Russian or Ukrainian model. In the wooded regions of Kirgizia and South-east Kazakhstan, the houses tend to copy the Siberian *izba* or Ukrainian *khata*. In the southern republics of Central Asia, however, the adobe type of building is still holding its own as being more suited to the climate. European furniture and household utensils are steadily gaining ground, although Soviet ethnographers report that in many instances a room furnished on Western lines is maintained only for show. Beds, for instance, are usually kept only as ornaments, the more general practice being to sleep on the ground.

Western diet has made next to no progress, and 'unclean' meat is still avoided. Although pig breeding is much encouraged, its progress is in strict relation to the extent of Russian settlement. Thus, in 1956 the number of inhabitants per pig in Kazakhstan was 8·2, whereas in Turkmenistan it was 43·7.

VII. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

THE essence of the Soviet Nationalities Policy was economic, and it is not therefore surprising to find that its impact on the economic life of the non-Russian nationalities has been much more far-reaching than in any other field. There can be no reasonable doubt that the fundamental reorganization of the economy of the Tsarist Asian empire has greatly improved the material condition of its Muslim inhabitants.

Thanks to a survey carried out during 1957 by the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.), it is now possible to obtain a generally accurate idea of the economic progress achieved in four of the eastern republics, that is, in the republics of Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenistan. The survey was based partly on published statistics, partly on information supplied directly to the Secretariat by the all-Union or Central Asian authorities, and partly on information obtained by members of the Secretariat during a visit to two of the republics—Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. The following is a brief summary of E.C.E.'s survey.

'The twelve-fold increase in Central Asia's industrial output between 1926 and 1940 accounted for relatively little in actual volume; less so since part of this growth only represented substitution of factory output for handicraft production and statistical "recognition" of the more or less unchanged production of craftsmen who joined artisan co-operatives.

'Near doubling of production in the following decade, however, was entirely a genuine increase. Since then, the annual additions to output in absolute terms have been four

times as big as in the inter-war years, and more than three times as large as in the period from 1940 to 1950.'

Total production has recently been growing at the rate of eleven per cent., output per man by six per cent. yearly. (The foregoing reflect official claims, and there is a strong likelihood that the percentages given are somewhat exaggerated.)

Industrialization has entered a new stage since the Second World War, in that 'the large-scale industries of the region gradually began to lose their character as a predominantly 'extraneous' sector in the Central Asian economy', that is, of enterprises staffed largely by specialists and skilled workers from the European parts of Russia.

Large numbers of villagers have at last been able to move into the towns and factory employment, 'with the result that large numbers of the indigenous population began to familiarize themselves with industrial life'.

Central Asia's still rising birth-rate is now 36·6 per thousand, against 25 per thousand in the U.S.S.R. as a whole. And its death-rate is only 6·7 per thousand, against the Soviet Union's overall rate of 7·7. Deaths—unlike births, which yield important State allowances for children—may be somewhat under-reported; but E.C.E. assumes that the population increase is, if not fully three per cent., at least 2·5 per cent. per annum—compared with a total Soviet rate of 1·7 per cent.

Second, Central Asia has the same experience as other countries in the early stages of industrial development: for example, the combined employment in industry and handicrafts was smaller on the eve of the Second World War than it had been at the turn of the century owing to the labour-saving effect of modern machinery and organization.

'Service' jobs have greatly increased with the expansion of the educational, health, and mass-information systems. In these fields 'the standards in Central Asia have improved so strikingly that the relevant comparison is no longer with

neighbouring Asian countries, but with those of Western Europe'.

The character and structure of Central Asian agriculture differ largely from those of the bulk of Soviet farming. Cotton, cultivated on the irrigated acres of collective farms that amount to huge plantations, remains its major crop.

Over five times as much cotton is grown now as on the corresponding territory before the Russian Revolution, supplying the U.S.S.R. with eighty-five per cent. of a much increased internal consumption and some exports. This has been obtained by trebling the area under cotton, and raising yields per acre by about two-thirds. Among the factors mentioned as responsible for these achievements were an increase of the area under irrigation by thirty-five per cent.; the application of very large amounts of fertilizer; the land reform and subsequent collectivization which 'abolished the old system of water rights and made possible a more rational system of water distribution'; better seeds, closer planting, tractor ploughing, and the use of insecticides; and a pricing policy which 'gave sharply progressive remuneration for high yields'. But the general level of labour productivity is still rather low; and the hidden reserve it represents is so great that Uzbekistan aims at making it by 1960 at least double that of 1955.

While cultivation and export of raw cotton and silk naturally remain the mainstay of its economy, not only cotton-ginning and the production of cottonseed oil but also the manufacture of fertilizers, of cotton-picking machines, and of sixty per cent. of the Soviet Union's output of spinning machinery are among the region's major industries. Cotton spinning and weaving account for four and five per cent. respectively of the Soviet Union's total output.

'Both steel and an increasing range of engineering products' are now made in Central Asia; and a 'wide range of industries producing building materials and light consumer goods show a share of total Soviet output that does not fall far short of the share of population'. As a result, 'Central

Asia can be characterized as a region equipped with a fairly broad range of consumer-goods industries, producing for the local market but dependent on imports for nearly all capital goods'.

There remains the question of relative living standards in Central Asia. Industrial workers' wages in Central Asia are the same as elsewhere in the Soviet Union for comparable labour; but a larger number in Central Asia are unskilled or belong to light industries that normally pay less than heavy industry. Yet, even so, what regional disparity in living standards there is between the Central Asian and European republics of the U.S.S.R. 'cannot', states E.C.E., 'be regarded as large compared with those found in other countries'. E.C.E. concludes that 'although average incomes per collective farmer in Central Asia are not unlikely to be higher than in the rest of the Soviet Union, average living standards for the region as a whole are probably one-fifth to one-fourth lower than the Soviet average, partly because there are more children per family, partly because urban incomes fall behind those in the rest of the Union, and partly because the urban population accounts for a much smaller share of total population. This regional disparity in living standards cannot be regarded as large compared with those found in other countries. There is hardly any European country without regions where *per capita* income or consumption is one-fifth or more below the national average, and in most European countries there are regions which fall more than one-third behind the average income of the country.' If it is true that average living standards in these four republics are only one-fifth to one-fourth below those of the U.S.S.R. as a whole, then it follows that 'they must be on much higher levels than in the neighbouring Asian countries, and that they have improved very considerably in the three decades since the end of the civil war. This statement remains true even though there are certain fields, such as dwelling-space per head in towns and *per capita* consumption of animal food, where there has been very little change in

quantity, although some improvement in quality, during the period of Soviet rule.'

Concerning the future, the report stresses the 'evolution in the level and orientation of education', and observes that the revolution in cultural patterns already carried out in Central Asia contributes to making its long-term economic prospects favourable, 'in spite of the difficulties which are bound to arise when the arrival of the large post-war generations on the labour market necessitates heavy outlays for directly productive investment'.

The achievements described above are a tribute to Soviet Russian dynamism, planning, and administration. How far they reflect the efforts and wishes of the Muslim peoples themselves is another matter on which the E.C.E. survey throws little or no light. Left to themselves as an independent nation or nations, the people of this region would hardly have developed their economy to the same extent, nor in all probability would they have wished to do so. It is sometimes argued that they would have grown rich from selling such valuable commodities in whatever markets they pleased. However this may be, the 'full sovereignty' which is now claimed for them does not include freedom to conduct direct trade relations with any country outside the U.S.S.R.; nor does the new plan for economic decentralization hold out any hopes of their being able to do so in the future. It is, of course, true that the native population is too sparse to exploit to the full the natural resources of the region, and it is officially claimed that the assistance provided by the Russians in man-power and know-how is merely that of an 'elder brother' anxious to help the Asians to place the resources of underdeveloped areas at the disposal of the whole Soviet community. But this cannot conceal the essentially colonialist character of the whole operation.

VIII. RELATIONS WITH THE NON-SOVIET EAST

THE Muslim republics of Soviet Asia are directly adjacent to the Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia, and have many ethnographic, climatic, and cultural features in common with them. It is therefore important to consider the Soviet Union's attitude towards the peoples of what is called the trans-frontier (*zarubezhnyy*), that is to say, the non-Soviet East.

According to the Soviet reckoning, the non-Soviet countries of the East are divided into three categories: the Peoples Democracies, that is, China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam, the colonial countries, and the semi-colonial countries. The last category includes countries like Iraq, Persia, India, and Pakistan, which, while regarded as to some extent politically independent, are considered to be under the economic control of the West.

In some respects the Soviet attitude to the colonial and 'semi-colonial' countries has remained constant ever since the Revolution: it assumes the working classes of these countries to be the dupes and even the slaves of the Western imperialist powers; and it stigmatizes these powers as uniformly evil and inhuman in their administration of colonies and in their relations with 'semi-colonies'. This is not an exaggeration—Soviet descriptions of Western 'colonialism' exclude the possibility of any extenuating circumstances or of any humanitarian or beneficial act by any imperialist government administration or individual official at any time. In other respects, however, the Soviet attitude has varied considerably. Until quite recently, a sharp distinction was drawn between the workers and to some extent the intelligentsia, on the one hand, and the ruling and land-owning classes and

the clergy on the other. The former were regarded as the allies of Socialism and the latter as the 'lackeys of imperialism'. But after the twentieth Party Congress of February 1956 there was a marked change: all classes of the people, including the big and petty bourgeoisie and the clergy, were now regarded as united, or as capable of being united, in the common struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism. This has resulted in a modification, perhaps only temporary, of the function of local Communist Parties, which had previously been regarded as the spearhead of Soviet policy. Whatever may be the ultimate aim of the present leaders of Soviet Russia, their emphasis is now not on the spread of Communism, or even of Socialism, in the Middle East and South Asia, but on the unity of the national forces of liberation in the common struggle against Western imperialism and colonialism.

Another significant change which affects the Soviet attitude towards the non-Soviet East relates to the eastern policies of the Tsarist régime. Reference has already been made to the change in the early Soviet line of whole-hearted condemnation of the Tsarist conquests and annexations in Asia. The same condemnation was extended to the Imperial Russian attitude towards such countries as Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, and this too has been greatly toned down. The general purpose appears to be the removal of the idea that Russia at any time *wished* to expand her territory. The nineteenth-century union of Transcaucasia and Central Asia with Russia is described as a voluntary one eagerly sought after by the peoples themselves as preferable to existing conditions. Any resistance that was offered was by 'reactionary elements' usually instigated by Britain. As explained in Chapter II, the abruptness of the change can best be apprehended by comparing the articles on Colonies in the first and second editions of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*. In the first, Russia's brutal exploitation of her colonial peoples is strongly criticized; in the second, there is no mention whatever of Russia ever having had any colonies, and

she is therefore omitted from the general attack on colonialism of which the article mainly consists. The same sort of difference emerges from a comparison of recent Soviet historiography on such matters as the Persian Revolution of 1906 with earlier Soviet writing on the same subject. Previously, Tsarist support of reactionary Persian forces, and particularly of Mohammad Ali Shah, was roundly condemned. Now, however, an effort is made to gloss over this and to show that British sympathy with the Persian constitutional movement was merely a sham. The Russian occupation of parts of Persian Azerbaydzhan from 1909 onwards is not now referred to, while non-existent British forces of occupation are accused of 'ravaging the cities of South Persia'. The bombardment of the Meshed Shrine by Russian troops in 1912, an incident closely related to the projected return to Persia of Mohammad Ali Shah, is found to have been the result of British provocation.

Too much should not be made of these and many other inconsistencies in the Soviet attitude towards the peoples and governments of non-Soviet eastern countries. The histories of all colonial empires abound in contradictions. Indeed, the creation of all these empires has been accompanied by a bewildering mixture of altruism and cupidity, of accident and design, of indulgence and oppression, of sincerity and hypocrisy, of satiety and expansionism, of the selfless devotion and tireless energy of individuals, and of the neglect and obtuseness of governments. At the time of the Revolution and for some years after it there was justifiable apprehension that the Soviet Union was intent either on expanding its borders to include the Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia or on bringing about their transformation into 'people's democracies' and thus into satellite states. This apprehension died down in the early 1930s and was not revived again until after the Second World War. Whether the Soviet Union still cherishes such expansionist intentions is a matter for conjecture. There can, of course, be no doubt that it wishes to extend its influence southwards

for a number of reasons, among which altruism and sympathy with the toiling masses and victims of Western colonialism can hardly be included. For the present, however, it seems that the Soviet Government has abandoned its earlier technique of subversion and direct action based on the hypothetical support of the masses and is less confident of being able to persuade the 'national bourgeoisie' in non-Soviet eastern countries to exchange the prospect of economic and political independence as understood in the West for the type of nationalism permitted in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union. Another consideration which must clearly give Soviet political planners pause is the contradiction between their present support of 'bourgeois nationalism' outside the U.S.S.R. and their continued suppression of it in their own eastern republics. How far this contradiction is evident either to the non-Soviet East or to the peoples of the Muslim republics it is difficult to say.

Soviet statements about the love of the Russian people, and indeed of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R., for the toilers of the 'colonial and semi-colonial' east and about their desire to liberate them from the colonialist and imperialist yoke need not be taken seriously. But the understanding which the Russians have shown of Asian and African problems and the techniques which they are now using in order to appeal to Asian and African peoples are an entirely different matter. Here they have begun to show great perspicacity, originality, and imagination.

Since the Revolution the Russians have developed a new conception of what are generally known as Oriental studies. The Soviet leaders early let it be known that they proposed in future to think of eastern countries not merely as unworthy and decadent heirs to a great but outworn tradition of wisdom, art, and learning, not merely as romantic and picturesque, but as modern countries with modern political, economic, and cultural problems. From the beginning they set out to implant this idea in the minds of Soviet Orientalists and in all institutions concerned with the study of inter-

national affairs. At first, they were confronted with many difficulties: academic life was gravely disrupted by the Revolution; the few competent Orientalists who remained in Russia were 'bourgeois' in their outlook; for various reasons the dispatch of students to study eastern problems at first hand was not feasible; finally, the declared Soviet policy of sympathy with eastern problems was not easy to reconcile with the hostile Soviet attitude towards the 'bourgeois nationalism' which was rapidly spreading over the Middle East and South Asia.

Between the Revolution and the Second World War the main preoccupation of Soviet Orientalists was with the history, religion, and languages of the Asian peoples of the Soviet Union. But from 1924 onwards a considerable amount of original literature on countries of the non-Soviet east was produced. Being entirely in Russian, it attracted little or no attention either in eastern countries or among western Orientalists, who seldom include Russian in their linguistic equipment. Then, as now, the latter regarded the work of Soviet Orientalists with an indifference closely bordering on contempt. But even before the last War the Soviet academic world, or rather the Communist Party, under whose control it worked, had shown a comprehension of the sensitiveness, bitterness, and national pride which had begun to obsess the intelligentsia of eastern countries, and which—with some notable exceptions—has so far made little impression on the cloistered conservatism of western Oriental scholarship.

Since the War, the enormous increase of Soviet material power, the failure of the techniques of subversion and direct action referred to earlier, and the manifest irritation and alarm with which most Middle Eastern countries have reacted to Western insistence on military defence have impelled the Soviet Government to change its tactics—and at the same time to attach more importance than ever before to the study of every conceivable aspect of Eastern affairs.

In May 1955 an article appeared in the Communist Party journal *Kommunist* which made it clear that the Soviet Union

intended to embark on a programme of research and publication on Eastern and African affairs with a scope which bids fair to exceed the efforts in these respects of the whole of the Western world put together. It is difficult to find out how much effect this article or the practical developments which followed it produced on Western governments or orientalists. The Scarbrough Report of 1946, which was specifically designed to cater for new requirements in oriental studies, was due for review in 1956, but it is not known what attention this review, if it ever took place, paid to this new and important development. Nor is there any evidence that the huge volume of Soviet publications devoted to the history, geography, economics, and culture of the East is receiving any systematic or cumulative attention in British or other Western universities today.

A complete survey of Soviet plans for the study of Eastern problems is outside the scope of this brief study; such a survey could, indeed, fill a considerable volume. Two subjects, however, must be briefly mentioned to which Soviet orientalism pays particular attention. The first is modern Asian and African languages and literature. The main effect of Soviet effort in this respect is not so much in the quantity, scholarship, and practicality of Soviet publications, as in the teaching of the modern forms of eastern languages to the large number of Soviet officials and specialists of various kinds now frequenting eastern countries. The second subject is history. Soviet historians all over the Union, and not least in the universities and academies of sciences in the eastern republics, are making a special study of the history of what is called 'the colonialist or imperialist period' both in Asia and in Africa. Soviet works on this subject are calculated to have a potent appeal for the peoples of both continents not only because they are written with this special purpose in view but also because they are up to date and take real account of nationalist aspirations. They also make a special point of quoting from histories of the same period from the hand of Western historians, most of them written many years ago

and usually from the imperialist standpoint. The amount of modern history of eastern countries at present being published in the West is very small by comparison with the Soviet output.

Russia's new drive to set herself up as the cultural mentor of the East is only just beginning; but two important landmarks have already emerged—the All-Union Congress of Orientalists of 1957 and the Congress of African and Asian Writers of 1958. Both these congresses were held in Tashkent and were accompanied by carefully organized publicity. The next international Congress of Orientalists is to be held in Moscow in 1960, and this is sure to be made the occasion for an effective display of Soviet achievement in the study and sympathetic understanding of the East.

In their dealings with eastern governments and peoples the Russians have in the past made many mistakes as a result of precipitancy, misunderstanding, and inexperience. In the days when Soviet military and economic power were far from assured the effect of these mistakes was often disastrous. Today, not only is the Soviet Union much stronger and much less sensitive to world opinion, but it has embarked on a programme of research and training which is calculated to reduce the number of such mistakes in the future.

CONCLUSION

In attempting to sum up the past and present state of the relationship between the rulers of Russia and the Muslims living in the Tsarist and Soviet empires certain basic facts must be borne in mind. The first and perhaps most important is the close historical and geographical connexion between Russians and Muslims and between Russian and Muslim lands. Secondly, the initial expansion beyond the confines of European Russia was into the virtually uninhabited lands of Siberia; the subsequent southward expansion to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan was mainly prompted by security considerations and a desire to reach the frontiers of 'properly constituted states'. Thirdly, the decision to perpetuate the Tsarist colonial empire was forced on Soviet leaders by practical considerations of what seemed to them to be over-riding importance: the Muslim nationalities were in no sense ready for self-government, and abdication of Russian authority over them would have dangerously imperilled the economy and security of the whole Russian state; Russian fears of British and Japanese designs were at the time of the Revolution genuine, even if unfounded. Finally, in the thirty-five years which have elapsed since the delimitation of 1924, and more particularly since 1950, there has been a remarkable advance in general and technical education, public health, and industrial and agricultural productivity, and the material standard of living has been greatly raised.

Few serious students of the available evidence would dispute the facts just enumerated. The available evidence includes the spectacle of a well-disciplined and reasonably well-fed, well-clothed, and well-educated population in the parts of the eastern republics accessible to foreign travellers;

nor is there any reason to suppose that these parts are not typical of the whole. Indeed, from a strictly material point of view the condition of the people of the republics is as good as could be expected, and is steadily improving.

There are, however, other circumstances which preceded or accompany the present state of material well-being: the rigours of the original Tsarist conquests, of the Civil War, and of the collectivization period; the drop of nearly a million in the Kazakh population between 1926 and 1939; the deportation a thousand miles from their homes of nearly a million Muslims during the Second World War; the presence in the Muslim lands of over six million Russian colonists; the regimentation of native culture; the retention by Moscow of control over the defence, foreign policy, and economy of the Muslim republics; and the great preponderance of Russians in research posts and the teaching professions. From a strictly material point of view it would be possible to admit all these circumstances while insisting that they were either inevitable or made necessary by the stubbornness and ignorance of the people, who did not know where their own interests lay. Such arguments have been advanced by many despots and old-fashioned imperialists in the past, and even linger on in some quarters today. They are not, however, the official arguments used by the Russians. They say that the Tsarist conquests saved the Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the predatory designs of the Western imperialists; that the Russian people have always been the Muslims' best friends; that the Civil War was exacerbated by capitalist intervention and that collectivization, cultural reform, colonization, and the control of economy, defence, and foreign policy from Moscow have been brought about by the will of the Muslim peoples themselves and opposed only by reactionaries working in the name of Islam or in the pay of foreign powers. This official line implies, of course, that neither the Soviet Government nor the Muslim peoples envisage or wish for any change in the present status of the republics.

In so far as the Russian people think about the matter at all, they probably believe in the official attitude as being the best for the Soviet state as a whole and as fulfilling the reasonable aspirations of the Muslim nationalities. There are, however, many indications that the authorities are dissatisfied with and even apprehensive about the attitude of the Muslims towards the régime. Summary dismissals of Muslim republican ministers and party officials are fairly frequent, and as recently as 1956 the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzan Communist Party was executed. But there is nothing to prove that such measures relate to any important nationalist movement; they are, indeed, more likely to be prophylactic or to relate to shortcomings in productivity.

The real attitude of the Muslims towards the Russians and the present régime is difficult to assess. There are some signs of resentment at interference with traditional culture and customs and at the preferential treatment accorded to non-Muslims in the matters of higher education and appointments. Indeed, there is a possibility that the Russian assumption of cultural superiority may engender a reaction even among those Muslims who take most advantage of Soviet educational and other facilities. Such a phenomenon would not be without precedent in other empires. Generally speaking, however, the present attitude is one of passive acquiescence tempered with some satisfaction with increasing material well-being and with the knowledge that in the circumstances there is nothing the Muslims can do to improve their political status. How far future generations of Muslims will become assimilated with the Russians or with the standard type of *homo sovieticus* remains a matter for speculation.

APPENDIX A

NOTE ON SOURCE-MATERIAL

The greater part of the factual material on which this study is based has been taken either directly or indirectly from Russian works published in the Soviet Union. A considerable portion of the necessary research had already been conducted by the Central Asian Research Centre and has appeared in one form or another in the *Central Asian Review.* In addition, recourse has been had to a few non-Soviet works which have been fully and carefully documented from Russian sources. More detailed acknowledgement of the sources used is made below.

Chapter I

Studies in Russian History, by Nicholas Ruskin—Bombay, 1945.
The History of Russian Culture, by D. S. Mirski—1949.
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Chapter II

The works of Lenin and Stalin.
The Formation of the Soviet Union, by Richard Pipes—1954.
Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1st and 2nd Editions.

Chapter III

Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917–1927, by Alexander G. Park—New York, 1957.
Turkestan im XX Jahrhundert, by Baymirza Hayit—Darmstadt, 1956.

CHAPTER IV

Articles on population in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 89–94; and Vol. V, No. 2, p. 120.
Narodnoye Khozyaystvo S.S.S.R.—Moscow, 1956.
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St. Antony's Papers No. 1—1957.
Réalités et limites de la presence russe en Asie Centrale, by H. Carrère d'Encausse (L'Afrique et l'Asie, 1958, 4e trimestre).

CHAPTER VII

Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 49. Regional Economic Policy in the Soviet Union: the case of Central Asia. (Acknowledgement is due to the Editor of *Far East Trade* for permission to use the summary of this survey which appeared in the issue of March 1958.)

APPENDIX B

DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS IN THE U.S.S.R.

SOVIET ASIA is generally assumed to be that part of the U.S.S.R. lying to the south of the Caucasus Mountains and to the east of the Ural Mountains. On the basis of figures published in 1956 the total population of this area is approximately sixty-seven millions, of whom about twenty-six millions are estimated to be indigenous. Of the latter figure, approximately fifteen millions are Muslims and live in the six union republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, and Kazakhstan. Of the remaining five million Muslims in the Soviet Union, the great majority live in that part of the R.S.F.S.R. lying outside Soviet Asia, that is, (*a*) in the Tatar and Bashkir A.S.S.R. (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Volga and Ural Regions (the latter actually straddles the Ural Mountains); and (*b*) in the Chechen-Ingush, Kabardin-Balkar, and Dagestan A.S.S.R., and the Karachay-Cherkess autonomous oblast in the Northern Caucasus.

The following table shows the population and racial composition of these divisions in so far as they are known:

	1956 *Population*	1939 *Population*	1939 *Racial Composition*		
		UNION REPUBLICS			
AZERBAYDZHAN (inc. the Nakhichevan A.S.S.R.)	3,400,000	3,209,700	Azerbaydzhanis	2,079,885	(64·8%)
			Russians	529,600	(16·5%)
			Armenians	388,373	(12·1%)
TURKMENISTAN	1,400,000	1,254,000	Turkmens	742,368	(59·2%)
			Russians	234,498	(18·7%)
			Uzbeks	106,590	(8·5%)
UZBEKISTAN (inc. Karakalpak A.S.S.R.)	7,300,000	6,282,000	Uzbeks	4,083,300	(65%)
			Russians	727,300	(11·6%)

	1956 *Population*	1939 *Population*	1939 *Racial Composition*	
		UNION REPUBLICS		
TADZHIKISTAN (inc. Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast)	1,800,000	1,485,100	Tadzhiks	883,634 (59·5%)
			Uzbeks	353,453 (23·8%)
			Russians and Ukrainians	152,965 (10·3%)
KIRGIZIA	1,900,000	1,459,300	Kirgiz	754,458 (51·7%)
			Note: Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, etc., also live here, but the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (2nd ed.) gives no percentages.	
KAZAKHSTAN	8,500,000		*Note:* No breakdown of nationalities in Kazakhstan is available from Soviet sources. The *Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1953) says that Kazakhs together with Russians make up 80% of the population.	
		AUTONOMOUS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS		
TATAR A.S.S.R.	2,785,000[1]	2,919,400	Tatars	1,430,506 (49%)
			Russians	1,255,342 (43%)
BASHKIR A.S.S.R.	3,223,000	3,144,713	*Note:* No breakdown of nationalities is available, but *Soviet Encyclopaedia* gives total number of Bashkirs in U.S.S.R. (1939 census) as 842,925.	
CHECHEN-INGUSH A.S.S.R.	544,000[1]	697,000	No breakdown of nationalities is available, but the 1939 census figures give the following:	
			Chechens	408,000
			Ingushes	92,100
KABARDIN-BALKAR A.S.S.R.	359,000[1]	—	Russians and Ukrainians	143,600 (40%)
			Note: The 1939 census gives the total number of Kabardintsy in U.S.S.R. as 164,100.	
DAGESTAN A.S.S.R.	958,000[1]	—	The 1939 census shows 15% Russians, the remainder of population made up of over 30 ethnic groups mostly Muslim.	
		AUTONOMOUS OBLAST		
KARACHAY-CHERKESS A.O.			Reconstituted in 1957. No details of population available. The 1939 census shows that the total of Karachays in the U.S.S.R. was 76,000.	

[1] According to ADMINISTRATIVNO-TERRITORIAL'NOYE DELENIYE SOYUZ-NYKH RESPUBLIK, 1958.

NOTE: At the time of writing the results of the 1959 census had not been published. The 1956 figures do not provide a breakdown by nationalities, but the approximate total of Muslims in the six union republics estimated according to the 1939 census as 13½ millions is now assumed to have increased to 15 millions.

Colonel GEOFFREY WHEELER has written this short study with the aim of describing the impact of the Russians and their civilization on the Muslim peoples of the eastern republics of the U.S.S.R. (Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaydzhan). The study begins with two historical chapters, these are followed by four chapters dealing with the demographic, cultural, social and economic impacts; the last chapter is concerned with the Soviet attitude towards the non-Soviet east. There are two appendixes, one describing the source material used and the other showing the distribution of the Muslim population in the U.S.S.R., and two maps.

Price 6s. net